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Great British Energy Bill

My Lords, I want to offer a slightly different perspective on this group of amendments. All the amendments in this group, and indeed some later groups, involve a series of rather worthy things—for which there are to be reports or other consequences—to be achieved by giving a direction to Great British Energy. While I support the amendments on the basis that they are probing amendments, I find it difficult to support the structure of the amendments themselves.

It seems to me that, by using the power of direction in Clause 6, the amendments would undermine the nature of that power and subvert the effectiveness of the power of direction, which is a long-standing feature of the control framework for public corporations. Powers of direction for nationalised industries were commonplace when nationalisation took hold from the 1940s onward. I do not know whether they existed before that, but they certainly have a pedigree of nearly 80 years. The first one of which I am aware is in relation to the Bank of England Act 1946, which nationalised the Bank of England. They have been a feature of public body legislation ever since, except in relation to bodies which are created as regulatory bodies.

The power of direction was never conceived as a mechanism for giving routine instructions to public bodies, which is what all the amendments in this group and the subsequent groups are trying to do. In fact, throughout the history of nationalised industries, the power of direction has almost certainly not been used. In relation to the Bank of England, I asked the previous Government fairly recently whether they would like to give up the power of direction over the Bank of England and whether they had used it since 1946; the answer was that they had never used it since 1946, but they definitely wanted to keep it. The fact that a power has not been used does not necessarily have any meaning, because it is designed as a backstop power for use in extreme circumstances. The mere fact of its existence can be a powerful weapon in the hands of the Government of the day.

It should be an uncontested fact that the Government ultimately call the shots in relation to public corporations, however much operational independence they claim to be handing over to them when they set the bodies up. The board of a public body should be very wary of not following the wishes of the Government of the day, unless those wishes conflict with their legal and statutory objectives.

I will always defend the ability of the Government to give directions to a public body, because public bodies should not be above the Government of the day. I think there are far too many public bodies, but if we have to have them, we must have an effective power of telling them what to do when necessary. I would definitely not want that core power to be diluted by being cluttered up with a lot of more day-to-day matters, which is partly what the amendments in this group and subsequent amendments do.

The concerns of my noble friend on the Front Bench and indeed other noble Lords who have drafted these amendments would be better met by placing specific requirements in the Bill, rather than by cluttering up the power of direction which has a very special place in the control framework for public bodies.